University of Wisconsin Milwaukee

UWM Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations

May 2013

Hume, Skepticism, and Induction
Jason Thomas Collins
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd
Part of the History Commons, and the Philosophy Commons
Recommended Citation
Collins, Jason Thomas, "Hume, Skepticism, and Induction" (2013). Theses and Dissertations. 85.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/85

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu.

HUME, SKEPTICISM, AND INDUCTION

by

Jason Collins

A Thesis Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
in Philosophy

at
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
May 2013

ABSTRACT
HUME, SKEPTICISM, AND INDUCTION
by
Jason Collins
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013
Under the Supervision of Assistant Professor Miren Boehm

This paper concerns the following interpretative problem: Hume’s most explicit
arguments in both the Treatise and the Enquiry strongly suggest that he is a skeptic about
inductive reasoning. This, indeed, has been the traditional interpretation. And yet, Hume
engages in and explicitly endorses inductive reasoning throughout his works. I examine
two prominent attempts to reconcile these features of Hume's position. One group of
commentators, the descriptivists, argues that Hume is not concerned with whether we
ought to accept inductive beliefs; he is only concerned with the psychological causes of
such beliefs. Because Hume is not concerned with the normative epistemic question,
there is no tension in his text. Another group, the externalists, takes Hume to be engaged
in an epistemological project; they even acknowledge the skeptical potential of Hume’s
arguments, but they reject the idea that Hume is a skeptic about induction because they
find in Hume an externalist strategy of justification which offers an escape from the
skeptical conclusion.
I criticize these readings on both textual and conceptual grounds. Against the
descriptivist, I argue that Hume is indeed engaged in normative epistemology. Against
externalist, I argue that Hume offers no broad solution to skepticism about induction. I
defend the following interpretation: Hume endorses skepticism about induction in
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philosophical reflection. Against the background of modern epistemic contextualism, I
argue that Hume appeals to multiple standards for belief justification depending on the
context of the investigation. Hume repeatedly announces the success of the skeptic in
destroying even our strongest beliefs, but only in cases of philosophical reflection: when
we examine the fundamental justification of our beliefs. But he also insists that the
power of the skeptic is destroyed when the inquiry shifts to practical matters: when the
context of inquiry is that of common life. These multiple justificatory standards explain
the apparent conflict between Hume's skepticism and endorsement of induction. I
conclude that this contextualist reading of Hume's work offers both the strongest
philosophical position for Hume, as well as an interpretation which sacrifices relatively
little of the traditional impact of Hume's skeptical arguments.
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1
0. Introduction
Traditionally, David Hume has been thought to advocate a radical skepticism
about induction, offering one of the most powerful versions of the problem of induction
in the history of philosophy. He argues that we have 'no reason' to assent to inductive
beliefs, and claims that inductive reasoning has "no just foundation" (T. I.3.6.10) 1.
These statements and the arguments supporting them have been interpreted as showing
that induction has no epistemic value. However, there is a strong tension between
Hume's supposed inductive skepticism and the fact that Hume uses, differentiates
between good and bad uses of, and endorses induction throughout his work. The
question then arises: how can Hume endorse, use, and differentiate between inductive
arguments while at the same time believing we have no reason to accept those
arguments?2 This paper will seek to examine how we should understand this tension in
Hume's philosophy.
I will discuss and criticize two prominent interpretive approaches which offer
quite different solutions. The first reading I will address, the descriptivist interpretation,
avoids the tension entirely by denying that Hume's project is epistemic at all. It argues
that Hume is not concerned with epistemic justification; instead he is merely concerned
with the psychological causes of inductive beliefs. If Hume is not concerned with
whether we should hold inductive beliefs, then there is no tension between his statements
and his use of induction. The second proposed solution, the externalist interpretation,
1

References to the Treatise are to David Hume, A Treatise Concerning Human
Understanding ed. L.A. Shelby-Bigge. Oxford University Press (1978), hereafter cited as
“T” followed by Book, part, section and paragraph numbers.
2
Interestingly, both Don Garrett and Kenneth Winkler identify resolving this tension as
the one of the most important issues in Hume scholarship at the time of their writing
(Winkler 1999).
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admits of Hume's epistemic project but claims that Hume actually finds a justification for
induction in the course of his inquiry. This position maintains Hume is advocating a
form of epistemic externalism. They resolve the tension by reading Hume's claims that
we have no reason to believe inductive arguments as saying that we have no internalist
reason to believe them. However, since Hume offers an externalist justification for
inductive beliefs, he can consistently claim that induction is not justified by our reasons
or arguments while still employing induction in a justified manner. I will sketch textual
and conceptual problems with these two readings that shed doubt on the theories' abilities
to adequately characterize Hume's epistemology.
After my brief examination of the two interpretations and their challenges, I will
offer an account which acknowledges both sides of Hume's treatment of induction while
still resolving the tension. I will argue that Hume is employing a form of epistemic
contextualism, basing the standards for belief justification on the context of the inquiry.
Using contextualism as a backdrop, I will show that we can make sense of Hume's claim
that we have no reason to believe the future will resemble the past and also Hume's use
of inductive reasoning by separating the claims into the contexts in which they apply. I
will then show that the contextualist reading has additional interpretive benefits beyond
the resolution of the tension which makes it an attractive interpretation of Hume's project.
I. The Tension in Hume
There are many instances throughout Hume's project in which Hume, at least on
the surface, dismisses inductive reasoning as completely unfounded. He says, "we cannot
give a satisfactory reason, why we believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will
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fall, or a fire burn" (E.XII.25)3. Even further, "Reason can never shew us the connexion
of one object with another, tho’ aided by experience, and the observation of their constant
conjunction in all past instances" (T I.3.6.12). For Hume, these statements are founded
on the principle that "we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object
beyond those of which we have had experience" (T I.3.12.20) along with the fact that we
have never had an experience of necessary connection (the foundation of inductive, or
probabilistic reasoning). Thus, Hume is led to conclude that we have no reason to make
inductive inferences. Instead, those beliefs are determined by custom or habit. Hume
writes, "when the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the
idea or belief of another, it is not determin’d by reason, but by certain principles, which
associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination" (T
I.3.6.13). After completing this reasoning, Hume seems to fall into a radical inductive
skepticism. He says, "I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no
opinion even as more probable or likely than another"(T I.4.7.8). These passages and
others like them have fueled the traditional, skeptical reading of Hume.4
However, a more recent interpretive trend has pointed out that Hume relies on
inductive beliefs for some of his most basic principles 5. Not only that, but Hume actually
endorses inductive arguments and differentiates between good and bad inductive
arguments as well. This has led to a drastic change in the way Hume is understood. After
3

References to the Enquiry are to David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding ed. L. A. Shelby-Bigge. Great Books of the Western World Britannica,
Chicago. (450-509) hereafter cited as “E” followed by section and paragraph numbers.
4
I will argue that the traditional reading is, at least partly correct. For additional
arguments in support of the skeptical reading see Stroud (1977), Winkler (1999), and
Parush (1977).
5
Loeb (2002) offers a history and summary of the evidence which has amassed against
the traditional skeptical reading (322-324).
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all, if Hume needs induction for his position to operate, surely he does not think it is
entirely worthless. We can see Hume's endorsement of inductive reasoning as early as
the subtitle of the Treatise, Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method to a
Moral Subject. The experimental method is, at its heart, an inductive procedure:
generalizing phenomena observed through experiment to the unobserved. Even the
foundation of much of Hume's empiricist philosophy is defended with induction. The
copy principle, the principle that all ideas are based on simple sense impressions, is
defended inductively. 6 This shows that Hume relies upon induction's epistemic worth for
the very foundation of his philosophical project. Finally, Hume rejects belief in miracles
based on the idea that there is stronger inductive support for belief in uniform laws of
nature than there is support for aberrations of those laws 7. Differentiation between good
and bad inductive arguments seems out of place if Hume means to dismiss all forms of
induction as unfounded. These and numerous other passages throughout Hume's work
strongly suggest that Hume finds some epistemic value in inductive argument. Given the
strength of evidence that Hume is not a skeptic about induction, we must find a way to
reconcile Hume's apparent dismissal of induction with its use throughout his writings.
Finding a plausible resolution to this tension will be the primary goal of this essay.

6

Hume offers two arguments for the copy principle, both of which are inductive. The
first is an argument from experience in which we are asked to examine any belief we can
think of to realize that it is reducible to simple impressions. He says, "We may prosecute
this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea which
we examine is copied from a similar impression" (E.II.6). This is, of course, generalizing
from observed phenomena to unobserved, or inductive argument. The second argument
in support is that men born blind do not have ideas of color, indicating the necessary
impression to form the idea. This again, is an inductive appeal to empirical evidence.
7
Winkler (1999) argues this as well. He notes that Hume's treatment of miracles in the
Enquiry offers a clear case of inductive discrimination (201-202).
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II. The Descriptivist Reading
The first solution I wish to address is the descriptivist interpretation, which has
been argued most prominently by Don Garrett. Garrett argues that Hume is not engaged
in normative epistemic investigation at all in the sections concerning induction of the
Treatise and Enquiry. Rather, Hume’s project is merely psychological; he is describing
the psychological process of belief formation and the psychological reaction to different
skeptical arguments. As such, when Hume says our beliefs are not founded on reason, he
is only concerned with the fact that reason is not the psychological cause of the beliefs.
He is silent, the descriptivist will say, about whether we ought to hold those beliefs.
Garrett says, "Hume's conclusion [...] directly concerns the causation of inductive
inferences--a question in cognitive psychology--rather than the justification of such
inferences, which is a question in epistemology" (Garrett 1997, 94).8 In this reading,
none of Hume’s explicit discussions of induction and causal reasoning in the Enquiry and
Treatise are normative. The descriptivist reading offers an elegant solution to the
tension because it rejects the idea that Hume ever claims that induction is unjustified, in
fact, he doesn't even consider the question.
Descriptivism boasts a good deal of textual support, largely because of what is
missing from Hume's discussion of induction: explicit normative language. When
discussing induction in Treatise I.3.6, Hume doesn't actually condemn induction any
further than to note that it is not founded on reason. Garrett points out that when Hume

8

Descriptivism comes in various strengths. Sometimes it is offered as a theory solely
about Hume's discussion of induction in Treatise I.iii.6. Other times it is used as a
general claim about Hume's views on induction. I am addressing the latter, because our
project here is to determine Hume's general views on induction, not merely in one
section.
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discusses induction, he only addresses the causation of inductive beliefs, not their
normative status. Hume states, for instance, that "even after we have had experience of
the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded
on reasoning, or any process of the understanding" (E.IV.15). Likewise, in the Treatise,
Hume says, "’tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we shou’d
extend that experience beyond those particular instances, which have fallen under our
observation" (T.I.3.6.13). Here, Hume's conclusions only mention the actual source or
mechanism of induction; we never see him stating whether we ought to accept the beliefs
given this fact. Reading these passages as epistemic is inferring an argument that Hume
never voices outright. Realizing this, coupled with arguments against maintaining a
purely skeptical account, the descriptivists argue that viewing Hume as doing normative
epistemology is a mistake. 9
I now wish to sketch some challenges and sacrifices which arise from accepting
the descriptivist interpretation. The first point weighing against the descriptivist is the
justificatory and epistemic nature of Hume's discussion of induction10. Hume's project,
on its face and when deeply analyzed, appears strikingly normative. Garrett rightly
points out that Hume does not explicitly endorse skepticism, but it seems that Hume is
doing more than seeking the psychological origin of inductive beliefs: he is seeking their
justification. This is shown most clearly in the arguments Hume rejects as possible

9

This is, of course, an extremely brief summary of the broad descriptivist claims and not
a detailed discussion of the points in favor or against the descriptivist. The point of this
section (and the following section) is to highlight issues and sacrifices of competing
interpretations; a full account of descriptivism is due, but is beyond the scope of this
paper. For more on the textual support for Descriptivism, and detailed arguments for and
against, see Loeb (2006) and Garrett (1997, 2006) and Millican (2002).
10
This objection is offered in various forms in Winkler (1999) and Loeb (2006).
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causes of induction. Hume considers several attempts to ground induction and dismisses
them as fallacious or circular. This poses a problem for the descriptivist. Louis Loeb
writes, "If the only issue in play in I.iii.6 is whether a demonstrative argument causes
inductive inference, it is difficult to see why demonstrations that are subtly flawed, but
have an air of plausibility, could not do the trick" (328-29). Hume rejects demonstrative
arguments for induction which depend on the uniformity principle not because they are
implausible sources of belief, but because they are flawed demonstrations. For instance,
it seems perfectly reasonable that a person could be psychologically motivated by a
circular argument, yet Hume rejects such an argument solely because it is circular11. He
says that the fact that the reasoning is circular shows that the "foregoing reasoning had no
just foundation" (T.I.3.6.10). This seems to indicate that Hume is looking for acceptable
or just arguments for induction, not just those which are psychologically plausible. That
Hume seems to require a good proof of induction indicates he is searching for its
justification, not explanation.
There is also compelling evidence in Treatise I.iv.7 and Enquiry XII to support a
epistemic reading of Hume's project. Hume states that we "cannot give a satisfactory
reason, why we believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn"
(E.XII.25). This occurs after he has reached the conclusion that all inductive reasoning is
based on custom. If we are to believe the descriptivist, though, all Hume has been trying
to show is that custom is the cause of our belief. If this is so, then Hume has already
11

In T I.iii.6 Hume rejects that the uniformity principle on past experience because to do
so would be circular. He says, "If you answer this question in the same manner as the
preceding, your answer gives still occasion to a new question of the same kind, even in
infinitum; which clearly proves, that the foregoing reasoning had no just foundation."
Rejecting an explanation for the sole reason that it's circular is problematic for the
descriptivist position, as examined above.
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achieved his goal of showing us why we believe: he has identified custom as the
psychological source. Additionally, Hume regards custom (the source of induction) as
"whimsical" and "fallacious" throughout these later sections (E.XII.22-23). The
descriptions 'satisfactory', 'whimsical' and 'fallacious', imply a search for epistemically
acceptable reasons for induction rather than psychologically plausible reasons. If custom
is the source of our beliefs, then its fallacy must be in its epistemic merit, not its causal
efficacy. That the foundation is still considered fallacious indicates that Hume is not
simply concerned with the source but the rational status of the foundation.
Finally, I would like to bring attention to an interesting passage from Enquiry XII:
The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper sphere, and display those
philosophical objections, which arise for more profound researches. Here he seems to
have ample matter of triumph; while he justly insists that all our evidence for any matter
of fact, which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory, is derived entirely from the
relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea of this relation than that of two
objects, which have been frequently conjoined together; that we have no argument to
convince us, that objects, which have , in our experience, been frequently conjoined will
likewise, in other instances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that nothing leads us
to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of our nature; which is indeed difficult to
resist, but which, like other instincts may be fallacious and deceitful. While the sceptic
insists upon these topics, he shows his force, or rather, indeed, his own and our weakness;
and seems, for the time at least, to destroy all assurance and conviction. These arguments
might be displayed at greater length, if any durable good or benefit to society could ever
be expected to result from them. (E.XII.23)
The passage reads as a direct summary of the conclusions of the argumentation found in
Treatise I.iii.6 and Enquiry IV, thereby linking it to Hume's discussion of induction.
Several things about this are striking from the perspective of the descriptivist. First, it is
Hume's Pyrrhonian skeptic that is 'justly' arguing these points (implying that these are in
fact epistemic, not psychological, concerns), and second the result of the argument is the
suspension of belief. Of course, the descriptivist may argue that this is merely a
descriptive passage, detailing the standard psychological effect of facing a skeptical
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argument. The descriptivist reading of this passage is plausible up until the last sentence.
Hume rejects the skeptic's arguments because there is no practical benefit to the path of
reasoning. Here Hume is concerned not with describing the psychological effects of the
argument, but whether we ought to assent to its conclusions. Though Hume sides against
the skeptic (and later sections will explain why he does this), he is considering the
normative question of whether we ought to offer these skeptical arguments. Therefore,
Hume should be taken to be making normative epistemic arguments in the passage.
Furthermore, because this passage acts as a summary of the argumentation in Enquiry IV,
the arguments which this passage is summarizing should be taken to be normative as
well.
Though just a sketch, these points highlight several drawbacks to accepting the
descriptivist position. The descriptivist must explain away the distinct epistemic nature
of Hume's projects as well as inconsistencies with Hume's conclusions in the end of the
Treatise and Enquiry. Because of these disadvantages, there is good reason to prefer a
theory which maintains the epistemic nature of Hume's views on induction, provided that
theory also solves the tension discussed earlier. Of course, these arguments require
further investigation and a full treatment both for and against, but it will be enough for
the current project to note that a theory which maintains the epistemic nature of Hume's
project will have a significant advantage over the descriptivist solution. In the following
sections I consider two proposals which seek to do just that: resolve the tension while
maintaining Hume's epistemic project.
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III. The Externalist Reading
The second attempt at resolving the tension appeals to epistemic externalism. The
externalists admit that Hume is concerned with the rational justification of induction, but
they resolve the tension by arguing that Hume actually finds a justification for induction
during his inquiry. Epistemic internalism seats the justification of a belief on the agent’s
evidence or arguments for the belief. If Hume is an internalist, he must be considered an
inductive skeptic because he explicitly states that we do not have access to such reasons.
The alternative is epistemic externalism. Externalism holds that belief justifiers can be
something other than the reasons or arguments the agent has available. For example, we
may justify beliefs on the basis of reliability, stability, etc. A prominent externalist
interpretation has been offered by Louis Loeb. He notes, "What matters here is that the
various options – appealing to irresistibility, proper functioning, adaptiveness, reliability,
stability—are externalist theories" (Loeb, 2006. 334). The externalists point out that if
Hume justifies induction with something other than one's personal reasons, then we can
easily explain why Hume says we have 'no reason' to support induction while still
employing it. Internal reasons don't justify inductive beliefs: external factors do. The
externalists note that inductive beliefs are determined "by certain principles, which
associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination"
(T.I.3.6.12). Hume calls these principles custom. The externalists maintain that custom
provides an externalist justification for the uniformity principle and induction. This alone
is enough to resolve the tension. Loeb notes, "Hume contributes key premises for the
skeptical argument about induction, but he does not share the internalist framework that
is also necessary to generate its conclusion. [...] Skepticism can be avoided, even if there

11
is no good argument of any sort supporting the uniformity principle" (Loeb, 2006. 333).
Hume's externalist justificatory framework resolves the tension while maintaining the
epistemic nature of the project.12
The externalist interpretation faces one major difficulty in explaining Hume's
works: Hume maintains the power of the skeptic to destroy beliefs even after
philosophical reflection has taken place. The externalist position maintains that the
proper justification of causal reasoning rests outside of a person’s epistemic position.
However, this means that inductive beliefs should not be held to internalist standards of
demonstrative argument. In other words, criticisms appealing to a lack of internalist
justification should hold no power over an externalist because the externalist has justified
his or her belief in a way that avoids the criticism entirely. Should the skeptical
arguments be posed to an externalist, the externalist would respond “I don’t need a
demonstrative argument to justify my belief; it is justified through its irresistibility 13”.
This is characteristic of a response of an externalist position to skepticism, after all, their
belief is justified. However, this is precisely not the response we find Hume using when
skepticism is presented. As we saw in the passage quoted above, "while the sceptic insists
upon these topics, he shows his force, or rather, indeed, his own and our weakness; and
seems, for the time at least, to destroy all assurance and conviction". Hume also states
that "this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest
philosophy" (E.XII.9). The skeptic does not hold power only before reflection, but any
time he engages in philosophical inquiry. As Kenneth Winkler points out, "Hume seems
12

Like the previous section, this discussion is merely intended to offer a brief summary
of the attempted solution to the tension and offer some difficulties it will face. For a full
treatment of the evidence for the externalist position, see Loeb (2002) and (2006).
13
Or one of the other externalist justifications listed above.
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to be telling us that when we occupy this view-point [of common life] (after passing
through the fires of Pyrrhonism), the authority of the other [the skeptical] is not entirely
forgotten" (Winkler, 207). On the externalist reading, we would expect internalistskeptical arguments to lose their power once we recognized that induction was justified
through external factors. Placing the justification for beliefs in an external source is the
solution to internal worries, so Hume should simply stand his ground against the
internalist's demands. Instead, Hume capitulates to the internalist worries until he is
drawn back out from those concerns. This should be taken as strong evidence that Hume
does not maintain a persistent externalist justification of causal reasoning. If he did,
internalist skeptical worries should lose their force.
This section should not be taken to mean that Hume is not employing an
externalist justification of induction at all. In fact, I will argue in the following section
that the externalists are largely correct. Hume does justify a system of inductive
inference through the principle of custom. However, a key factor that is missing from the
externalist account, one which is crucial to understanding Hume's project, is the fact that
the externalist solution only applies in some circumstances (like playing backgammon)
and not in others (like philosophical reflection or academia). In the following section, I
offer a contextualist reading of Hume which takes the progress and insights of the
externalist reading and makes sense of the continued power of the skeptic in Hume's
work.
IV. The Contextualist Reading
We have seen that Hume should be understood as doing normative epistemology
in section II. This epistemic reading seems to leave us with two choices: the skeptical or
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the externalist. However, we have already discussed the difficulties with taking Hume to
be offering purely externalist or skeptical arguments. Consider the following passage:
For I have already shewn, that the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its
most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of
evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life. We save ourselves
from this total scepticism only by means of that singular and seemingly trivial property of
the fancy, by which we enter with difficulty into remote views of things, and are not able
to accompany them with so sensible an impression, as we do those, which are more easy
and natural. (T.I.4.7.7)
Here, Hume is making two statements: when reason runs free, we cannot treat one
opinion as more likely than the next, yet we are often forced by nature to accept a
principle which produces inductive beliefs. The skeptical interpretation focuses on the
first, explaining how we have 'no evidence in any proposition'. The externalist explains
the second: that a certain principle, custom, 'saves us from total skepticism'. In order to
avoid the problems involved with taking either the purely externalist or purely skeptical
interpretation, I will offer a reading which accounts for both of Hume's points. To explain
both the skeptical result and the justification of induction, I will argue that Hume is
utilizing multiple standards of justification in a method very similar to modern epistemic
contextualism. 14
Contextualism is a theory about knowledge which maintains that the standards for
whether an agent knows a proposition are based on the context of the knowledge
ascription. In ordinary contexts, the standards for whether S knows P are relatively low.
In contexts such as scientific or philosophical inquiry, the standards are considerably
higher. What counts as knowledge in an everyday conversation will not count as
knowledge to a scientist or philosopher. The contextualist maintains that these are two

14

Hereafter simply contextualism.
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separate standards for knowledge, both of which represent knowledge relative to those
standards.
One method of thinking about context sensitive knowledge claims is with
reference to the uncontroversial context dependence of terms like ‘tall’ or ‘flat’. The
soccer field may be flat to the referee, but it is not flat to the geometer. However, both
the referee and geometer are speaking truly in their assessment of the field, even though
they are apparently disagreeing. The context of inquiry determines whether a field counts
as flat or a man counts as tall. Likewise, for the contextualist, what an agent knows is
determined by the context of the utterance. So whether S knows P depends on the
strength of the standards for evaluating knowledge. Consider Pyrrho and a commoner
debating whether or not each knows that he has hands. The commoner, who has very low
standards for knowledge, truly claims that he knows he has hands. He is concerned with
everyday tasks and simply living his life. Pyrrho, with very high standards, truly claims
that he does not know that he has hands. Pyrrho is concerned with obtaining certainty, so
he must consider the possibility that he may be wrong. Whether S knows P is relative to
the context of the inquiry and the standards of that context. An important part of the
contextualist framework will be how different standards interact with each other. In
cases of disagreement, many contextualists hold that the higher standards win out.
Standards are often based on which considerations are allowed and which are excluded,
so when higher standards bring new considerations into play, they raise the standards for
knowledge. As David Lewis says in Scorekeeping in a Language Game,
The commonsensical epistemologist says: 'I know the cat is in the carton---there he is
before my eyes---I just can't be wrong about that!' The sceptic replies 'You might be the
victim of a deceiving demon.' Thereby he brings into consideration possibilities hitherto
ignored, else what he says would be false. the boundary shifts outward so that what he
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says is true. Once the boundary is shifted, the commonsensical epistemologist must
concede defeat. And yet he was not in any way wrong when he laid claim to infallible
knowledge. What he said was true with respect to the score as it then was. (Lewis, 355)
So we see how the boundaries in a bare-bones contextualism are supposed to operate. A
person's standards for justification set which considerations are ignored and which are
entertained. When the skeptic moves to entertain skeptical considerations, those
considerations change what is and isn't justified. In this way, the possibilities that are
ignored are just as important as those possibilities that are allowed. Those contexts
which allow many possibilities (like Pyrrhonism) are high standards and those which
ignore many possibilities (like common sense) are low standards. There are, of course,
many versions of contextualism with many different frameworks for how boundaries
interact. These can range anywhere from theories which disallow real disagreement
between contexts to those which state that the high standards always win 15. A full
account of contextualism and its methodology is beyond the scope of the paper, but the
brief description of the basic tenets of contextualist theory are enough to show the
striking parallels with how Hume's skepticism functions in his works.
Contextualism offers us a background for understanding Hume's position.
Recognizing that Hume is employing multiple standards for justification grounded on the
context of the action, we can explain why Hume would at once dismiss inductive
reasoning and employ it extensively. First, I will demonstrate the multiple standards of

15

For a rather complete summary of different contextualist strategies on the subject, and
a complete summary of the varying contextualist positions see DeRose (2009) 128-152.
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justification at work in Hume's project, and then I will explain how those standards
resolve the tension stemming from Hume's treatment of induction. 16
Hume differentiates the multiple standards of justification by which arguments
have force in them. He says,
Though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and
confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to
flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and
speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned
themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be
the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are
mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition
of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most
diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or
to remove the objections, which may be raised against them. (E.XII.23)
Here we see the separation of contexts, one in which the skeptic 'enjoys ample triumph'
and the other in which her position is 'but a dream'. These are the bases for the contexts
of justification in Hume's work. One, the philosophical context, is that of deep inquiry;
this is the context in which one searches for the foundations of our beliefs. Hume wants
to find out which of our beliefs are supported by reason alone: which beliefs we are
rationally justified in holding. We have seen this argument play out in earlier sections of

16

The skepticism referred to in many of the following passages is academic or
Pyrrhonist skepticism and not necessarily solely inductive skepticism. However, the
context of Hume's discussions of broader skepticism make clear that he is intending to
include the inductive skepticism in these discussion. First, that these sections operate as
conclusions of the books concerning induction. Indeed induction is the main focus of the
Enquiry, the source of many of the contextualist texts. Second, note the many references
to causal reasoning, or any reasoning founded upon the uniformity principle. The
uniformity principle is the "principle which makes us reason from causes and effects;
and, [...] which convinces us of the continu'd existence of external objects, when absent
from the senses" (T I.4.7.4). As such, we should not maintain that inductive skepticism is
somehow not included in these passages' references to Pyrrhonism or skepticism. In fact,
that Hume speaks this way of skepticisms more generally bodes well for the use of the
contextualist reading as an interpretation of Hume's broader skepticism, though this is a
much larger topic than the paper will address.
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this paper, and we have seen the skeptical results. Hume descends through our everyday
knowledge, testing the justification for our beliefs until he reaches the core justification
for nearly all of our beliefs: the uniformity principle. Upon finding the uniformity
principle without foundation, Hume is ready to reject all belief. However, Hume
maintains that the force of the skeptic is destroyed when we exit that context of deep
inquiry and pursue other ends. He says, "the great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the
excessive principles of scepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of the
common life" (E.XII.21). When we engage in action, we are placed into a context in
which the principles of skepticism lose their force, and the principle producing inductive
beliefs, the uniformity principle, is forced upon us. I will argue later in this section that
custom provides a justification for both the uniformity principle and induction. I will call
this context in which the uniformity principle is active the context of common life.
Of course, a brief sketch of two contexts of justification is not enough to show
this as Hume's solution to the tension. I will now discuss the two contexts in more depth,
and explain how each operates as a source of belief justification in Hume's system. There
are two key factors to keep in mind to understand the contexts at work in Hume and how
they relate to a contextualist reading. The first is the goal of the inquiry. This is the
benefit which is meant to be achieved through the inquiry or knowledge ascription. The
goal of inquiry shapes the second factor: the possibilities that may be taken into account
while performing the inquiry17. These two factors, the goal of the inquiry and the
hypotheses allowed by that goal, will illuminate how Hume resolves the tension.

17

Note the similarities to the Lewis quote above in which what separates high from low
standards is the live possibilities.
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First, I will discuss the context of the philosopher. This context is defined by the
search for the basic foundations of our beliefs. Hume enters the context because he is
"uneasy to think I approve of one object, and disapprove of another; call one thing
beautiful, and another deform’d; decide concerning truth and falshood, reason and folly,
without knowing upon what principles I proceed" (T I.4.7.12).

It is in an attempt to

determine these principles that Hume famously finds that we have no reason to accept
that the future will resemble the past, and it is this reasoning which results in his radical
skepticism. After completing his inquiry with the above goal, he finds himself "ready to
reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or
likely than other" (T I.4.7.8). This is the result of the philosophical context: the discovery
that induction is unjustified under its considerations.
Because the philosophical context is characterized by seeking the basic
foundations of our beliefs, the context involves taking into consideration skeptical
hypotheses which serve to undermine our assurance in those beliefs. In Lewis' quote
above, it is a deceiving demon; for Hume it is the consideration that the future may not
resemble the past. Every contrary hypothesis must be ruled out in the philosophical
context, demanding the utmost internal justification for one's beliefs. Hume notes that
the consideration of skeptical hypotheses is the bedrock of the philosophical context. He
writes,
While a warm imagination is allow’d to enter into philosophy, and hypotheses embrac’d
merely for being specious and agreeable, we can never have any steady principles, nor
any sentiments, which will suit with common practice and experience. But were these
hypotheses once remov’d, we might hope to establish a system or set of opinions, which
if not true (for that, perhaps, is too much to be hop’d for) might at least be satisfactory to
the human mind, and might stand the test of the most critical examination. (T I.4.7.14)
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Here we see the philosophical context being grounded by taking into account skeptical
considerations, and those considerations rendering our sentiments unjustified. We also
see a striking similarity with the workings of Lewis's contextualist system, which based
standards for justification on the active considerations (the conversational score). Hume
has shifted the scoreboard, in Lewisean terms, to make those inductive beliefs which
were justified before the shift no longer justified in the new context. In this context,
radical skepticism reigns supreme because the skeptical considerations destroy
confidence in our inductive beliefs.
Hume notes, however, that by allowing the full extent of skeptical possibilities,
the philosophical context is very limited. "The sceptic [...] had better keep within his
proper sphere, and display those philosophical objections, which arise from more
profound researches" (E.XII.22). The skeptic's "proper sphere" is abstract reasoning,
removed from real world concerns. For "these principles may flourish and triumph in
schools; where it is indeed difficult if not impossible to refute them. But as soon as they
leave the shade and by the presence of the real objects [...] are put in opposition to the
more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave even the most
determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals" (E.XII.21). Action in
common life is antithetical to the goal of the philosophical context, and outside of that
context, different standards weigh on belief justification. Hume states the skeptic "must
acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his
principles universally and steadily to prevail" (E.XII.23). Common life includes an
inherent goal of inquiry: living life, and living life imposes certain limits on the
possibilities we may consider. When we wish to engage in practical pursuits, the
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hypotheses which we are able to consider are limited. These practical concerns place us
into a new context of justification, the context of common life, in which induction is
justified.
We may now ask why induction must be justified at all in the context of common
life. Certainly, we could live our lives if we simply assumed that we were justified in
forming beliefs through induction. Assuming induction to be justified in common life
may solve the problem of making practical actions in the face of radical skepticism, but it
cannot solve Hume’s tension. If we are merely making a flawed assumption (rather than
embracing a lower standard) then the fact that Hume rests so much of his philosophical
project on induction would seem a crucial flaw. How could the bedrock of Hume’s
project, the copy principle, be founded merely on an assumption without justification? If
we, as interpreters, want to truly resolve the tension between the skepticism of Hume's
arguments and his use of induction, we must find a way to justify induction, even in a
limited context.
We have seen that common life limits how high our standards can shift. This is
why Hume states, as I quoted above, that common life is the great subverter of
"excessive" skeptical principles. This subversion comes in the form of the uniformity
principle, which is the foundation of all inductive beliefs. In the philosophical context,
Hume found the uniformity principle to be without foundation; however, Hume notes that
when we step into the real world, the uniformity principle can no longer be questioned.
This principle provides the separation between the two standards. It is a boundary placed
on our reason so that we can function in common life. Of course, even in the context of
common life, the uniformity principle is not founded upon reason, but by "some other
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principle which determines him to form such a conclusion. This principle is Custom or
Habit” (E.V.35-36). Following the insights of the externalists, it is custom which
provides justification of our inductive beliefs. Custom forces upon us a limitation to the
standards of justification we are allowed to use, lowering our standards and allowing
more beliefs to be justified. Which specific feature provides the justification I will
deliberately leave unspecified. The externalists attribute the justifying force to different
features of custom depending on their interpretation. Loeb argues that it is the fact that
custom produces steady, reliable beliefs (Loeb, 334). Others identify custom's
irresistibility, proper functioning etc. The contextualist is not bound to any specific
justifying factor; all the contextualist needs to note is that there is good reason to believe,
along with the externalist, that Hume considers custom to be a source of epistemic
justification for the uniformity principle.18 What separates the contextualist from the
externalist, however, is that custom is limited to the context of common life. In the
philosophical context, custom does not hold power, and thereby is not an active justifier.
Of course, merely justifying the uniformity principle does not itself build a robust
system of belief justification. For instance, any common man on the street believes
according to the uniformity principle, and Hume does not simply wish to justify all
beliefs, like beliefs in miracles or superstitions, in the context of common life. I will
explain how, from the establishment of the uniformity principle, Hume sets up a method
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Clearly, identifying the feature of custom which provides justification is an important
project for this interpretation. I am partial to Loeb's suggestion that it is custom's
stability, and some features may fit better with the contextualist reading that others.
However, this argument must be saved for a future time. For now, it suffices that
contextualist can appeal to one of many externalist justifications; as long as custom
provides an externalist justification for the uniformity principle, the contextualist account
can get off the ground.
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of justifying beliefs which allows us to operate as 'philosophers' in the common context.
In doing so, Hume illustrates that the common life context is one of justification,
separating those who reason well from those who reason poorly inside of it. Hume
separates the two, saying of those who merely exist in the common context via ignorance,
"many honest gentlemen, who being always employ’d in their domestic affairs, or
amusing themselves in common recreations, have carried their thoughts very little beyond
those objects, which are every day expos’d to their senses. And indeed, of such as these I
pretend not to make philosophers, nor do I expect them either to be associates in these
researches or auditors of these discoveries" (T I.4.7.14). The 'discoveries' to which Hume
refers are that, strictly speaking, human belief is not founded on reason and the proper
way to form beliefs in light of that discovery. To separate his system of reasoning from
those of the non-philosophical, Hume offers what Garrett identifies as the Title Principle:
"Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to.
Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate on us." (T I.4.7.11). We can see
how the Title Principle operates as a justifier by analyzing its parts. First, Hume is
relying on reason for the justification, but we have seen the result of relying too much on
reason in previous sections. Reason is the force that shifts standards upwards, taking into
consideration new hypotheses in the pursuit of certainty. When it runs free, it leads us
into the philosophical context, and to skepticism. No inductive belief is based solely on
reason. Therefore, we need limitations on the application of reason if we are going to
operate in common life, and these limitations are provided by the conditions of liveliness
and the mixture with propensity. What it means to state that reason is lively is that the
matter seems important and stimulates our interest. Hume notes that in some contexts,
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skeptical considerations "appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in
my heart to enter into them any farther" (T.I.4.7.9 ). However, he also notes that when he
grows tired "with amusement and company, and have indulg'd a reverie in my chamber,
or in a solitary walk by a river-side, I feel in my mind all collected within itself and I am
naturally inclin'd to carry my view into all those subjects, about which I have met with so
many disputes in the course of my reading and conversation" (T.I.4.7.12). The liveliness
condition, then, is the requirement that our reason be stimulated; that we are naturally
inclined to assess the hypotheses under consideration. Liveliness is closely linked with
the second limitation on reason; that reason must mix itself with some propensity: some
natural tendency for action. This is the external limitation of the goal of inquiry. Our use
of reason should be in service to completing some action (the goal of the inquiry), and
that action places limitations on how far reason can act. Only considerations compatible
with the goal of inquiry are allowed to have title to operate on us. These two limitations
allow reason to be applied in the common context, and from them we can justify beliefs
in that context.
With this principle, Hume is providing a system of justification for the context of
common life. In contextualist terms, Hume is advocating the use of reason to shift the
standards of justification to the upper bounds allowed by the goal of inquiry. The
uniformity principle sets an upper boundary on how high their standards can shift, and
the Title Principle recommends that we allow reason to run free up to that point. By
raising the standard for justification to the boundary of the uniformity principle, we are
being as skeptical as possible while still remaining in the context of common life. The
Title Principle pushes our inquiry on both ends, driving our standards for inquiry up to
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exclude beliefs that do not meet the rigorous examination of reason, while preventing
reason's excessive application to avoid the uselessness of skepticism. Hume wants to
find a way to assess the questions of philosophy and science without falling into the
uselessness of skepticism. The realization that the uniformity principle provides a
boundary for standards of justification compatible with critical examination and living
life provides his solution. The Title Principle allows reason to be applied to the context
of common life in a restrained, controlled manner, and its use produces a system of belief
justification above and beyond the uniformity principle.
This system of reasoning is exemplified by Hume's recommendation that we
exhibit a mitigated skepticism in Enquiry XII. Hume says of the mitigated skeptic,
Those who have a propensity to philosophy, will still continue their researches; because
they reflect, that, besides the immediate pleasure, attending such an occupation,
philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and
corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, so long as they
consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and
their inaccurate operations. (E.XII.25)
Mitigated skepticism is, as he says, the new context for the philosopher to occupy. The
philosophical context leads to radical skepticism, and Hume rejects that result because of
its incompatibility with human life. Hume recommends maintaining a healthy critical
standard, one in which we are skeptical of arguments without questioning the
fundamental principles of our reasoning. This mitigated skepticism works well in the
framework I have laid out above as it represents Hume strengthening the context of
common life as far as it will go.19 He is using reason to 'methodize and correct' the
reasoning found in common life: inductive reasoning. We have multiple standards of
justification, separated by which hypotheses are being considered, and Hume wishes to
19

Or, alternatively, creating another standard of the common life philosopher.

25
push critical thinking as far as it will go while still being compatible with the goal of
living life. This context is separate from the contexts of either the common man, who
simply believes without reflection, and the skeptic, who believes nothing; it finds a
middle ground in which we are able to apply rational criticism without falling into the
depths of skepticism. This, of course, is Hume's upshot at the end of the Treatise book I
and the Enquiry: a system of principled, critical reasoning while remaining in the context
of common life.
The interplay between the standards is another factor that sets the contextualist
interpretation apart from either the skeptical interpretation or the externalist.20 Hume
notes that the skeptic holds the power to throw us into skeptical amazement with his
arguments, but that amazement is fragile. The contextualist reads this as saying that the
skeptic holds the power to shift the context of inquiry further by introducing concerns
that were previously omitted from consideration, but that those considerations are only
active for a short time. Consider two men at the bar. One is talking about how his dart
will stick to the dart board. The other man, a skeptic, goes through Hume's arguments
until the first realizes that there is no reason for him to believe that his future throws of
the dart will resemble his past throws. The dart thrower must then admit that he does not
know, or does not have reason to believe that his dart will stick if thrown correctly, no
matter how many times he has seen the dart stick before. However, in doing so, the
skeptic has also made the goal of playing the game impossible, at least until the context
shifts back. Once the two turn their mind back to the game, and trying to score the most
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And also, I will suggest, another two-standard view offered in Winkler (1999). The
two views share important similarities and differences which I discuss at the end of this
section.
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points, they cannot help themselves from thinking that the dart will stick if thrown
correctly because the context has shifted back to the practical concerns, thereby justifying
the inductive belief. This account is faithful not only to the Humean interaction between
a skeptic and an ordinary man, but also the contextualist account (as seen in Lewis
above). It also helps us specify what kind of contextualism Hume seems to be
advocating. For Hume, the higher standards 'win' in a context, as long as there are not
external limitations on how high the context can go. Thus we see the parallel between
Hume's handling of skepticism and the contextualist position.
This interpretation holds great power to resolve the tension in Hume's work while
avoiding the sacrifices and problems of the other proposed solutions. The standards
explain the tension by noting that Hume separates his discussion of induction into two
sets of circumstances. The first, which I have labeled the philosophical context, is one in
which he is concerned with the rational foundation of our beliefs. It is with this concern,
and within this context, that he makes the claim that we have no reason to believe in
induction. In fact, he explicitly says that those hypotheses only hold weight in the
academic sphere, removed from the concerns of common life. Outside of that context,
Hume finds that we are compelled by nature, by custom, to believe in the uniformity
principle. From custom, Hume derives a system of justification which allows the use of
induction, but again, only within that specified context. What is justified for the
philosopher in an academic hall is not the same as what is justified for the backgammon
player, and this is crucial to understanding the apparent tension in Hume's treatment of
induction. The tension is only present if we fail to recognize the multiple contexts of
justification at work in the project.

27
This may prompt the objection that Hume, in doing philosophy, cannot justify his
use of induction, even under my interpretation. After all, the philosophical context
refutes induction, so doesn't the contextualist reading fail to justify Hume's use of
induction in his philosophical corpus? Not if we are clear about the context of his
philosophical work. Hume wishes to naturalize abstract philosophy and introduce a
practical benefit to what he sees as useless metaphysics. This is clear even in the subtitle
of the Treatise, Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning
into a Moral Subject. Hume's project, though a work of philosophy, is to introduce that
philosophy into the practical context. Hume recognizes the pitfalls of the unrestricted
philosophical context, and thus adopts a strong context, the context of the mitigated
skeptic, to allow himself to conduct philosophy with practical results. It is in this final
context, the one which Hume explicitly suggests philosophers exhibit, that Hume's
project lies. Thus, Hume's use of induction is justified because his work exhibits the
context of the mitigated skeptic, not the unrestricted philosopher.
To conclude this section, I would like to briefly discuss a similar interpretation of
Hume's epistemology. In Hume's Inductive Skepticism, Kenneth Winkler argues that
Hume is a skeptic, but that everyday judgments are insulated from that skepticism by
natural forces. He builds from that insulation “two sets of norms, and with them two
standards of reasonableness” (Winkler, 206) that he uses to resolve Hume's tension in
much the same way as I use the justificatory contexts in the contextualist interpretation.
The contextualist and insulation interpretations are alike in that they point out key
features in Hume's writing which seem to suggest multiple standards of justification.
However, while the insulation view recognizes two standards of reasonableness, the
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interplay between the standards is better explained by the contextualist position. This is
the key difference between the two interpretations.
The insulation view provides two norms of reasonability, one in which the
foundations of beliefs are challenged (what I call the philosophical context) and one
which uses rules derived from a commitment to the uniformity principle (the context of
common life). However, the two standards are separated by largely different justificatory
systems. One uses a process of natural, reliabilist justification, while the other is purely
rational. This differs from the contextualist interpretation, where the standards are
separated by different strengths of hypotheses taken into consideration in the contexts.
As we have seen previously in this section, Hume speaks of people shifting between
standards within single conversations. Because Winkler defines the standards as being
separated by two mostly-unrelated processes of reasonableness, it is not clear why one
would shift between the standards so easily. What instigates the switch between contexts
and why should we make the switch at all? The contextualist background provides a
much more detailed account of the separation between standards. We can explain the
shift based wholly on which hypotheses are and are not active in the inquiry. The
standards shift by taking new hypotheses into account, and which hypotheses are allowed
is determined by the goal of the inquiry via the Title Principle. Without the account of
context-based standards, we are left wondering how the norms interact with one another.
The contextualist interpretation not only explains how standards shift but why.
Winkler poses an unanswered challenge for the insulation view: "why our failure to
satisfy the norms at work in section iv gives us a reason--a positive reason-- to confine
our enquiries to common life" (Winkler, 208). In the contextualist interpretation, one’s
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standards are relative to the goal for that inquiry. Standards can be incompatible either
because they are too low or too high for the goal in question. We saw this with the dart
thrower. The standards for playing the game externally forced the skeptic to limit his
standards if he wished to play the game. He could keep his high standards, but doing so
would be incompatible with playing the game. In the same way, the goal of living life
inherently rules out skeptical standards. Given that we are necessarily concerned with
living life, we have a positive reason to limit our contexts to those compatible with that
goal.
Ultimately, the contextualist position may be considered a close relative of the
insulation interpretation21, one that reduces the separation between standards and allows
more of Hume's writing to be explained. The principal benefit of using a contextualist
framework to understand Hume's treatment of skepticism is that it allows for a detailed
description of the workings of the different justificatory standards. We not only make
sense of the conflict between Hume's recommendation and condemnation of induction,
but we do so in a more philosophically complete way.
V. Benefits and Conclusions
As we have seen, the contextualist interpretation offers a solution to the tension
discussed at the beginning of this paper, and does so while avoiding the pitfalls of the
other competing interpretations. The traditional skeptical reading has its textual support,
but cannot resolve the tension. The descriptivist has to sacrifice the epistemic nature of
Hume's project to resolve the tension, and with it, has to explain away a large amount of
textual support for the epistemic reading. Also, it sacrifices some of the historical import
21

Though the contextualist interpretation did not begin as an adaptation of the insulation
view, the two have enough similarities to see them as related in this way.
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of Hume's argument, having to claim that Hume offers all the pieces to express the
famous problem of induction, but does so incidentally, since he is not concerned with
inductive justification at all. The externalist interpretation maintains that Hume provides
a consistent solution to skepticism, which conflicts with the text. The contextualist
reading avoids all of these issues. It can explain the tension satisfactorily, placing it ahead
of the straight skeptical reading. It does not need to dismiss or explain away large
portions of seemingly epistemic textual evidence. Further, it explains the apparent
externalist justification of induction without making that justification too strong. So the
contextualist reading provides many of the benefits of the skeptical and externalist
readings without the textual sacrifices of the descriptivist. As a result, the contextualist
reading is a very promising interpretation of Hume's epistemology.
The contextualist interpretation also makes sense of other puzzling passages that
stem from Hume's treatment of causal arguments. For instance, in the Dialogues on
Natural Religion, Hume famously discusses the causal reasoning employed by the design
argument for God. He says that the argument boils down to one proposition, "That the
cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human
intelligence" (122). He continues that this proposition is flawed and that it "affords no
inference that affects common life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance"
(122). In the face of this realization, Hume wonders "what the most inquisitive,
contemplative, and religious man [can] do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to
the proposition", claiming we should believe the "arguments on which it is established
exceed the objections which lie against it" (122). Here we see a similar problem to the
original tension; Hume is claiming that we ought to assent to an inductively supported
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principle even though it cannot be rationally justified. Though our reason fails to
establish the existence of a Deity, Hume still thinks we are justified in accepting the
proposition in everyday life. He says, "A person, seasoned with a just sense of the
imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity" (123).
Hume is noting that although the argument from design holds no weight in the
philosophical context, the probable reasoning which leads us to the belief is justified in
the common context. In fact, using the Title Principle as the method of inductive
reasoning, we have shown what Hume means by saying that one "flies to revealed truth".
When we limit ourselves to the context of common life, arguments from analogy hold
weight, and we are justified in assenting to their conclusions in that context. The
problem dissolves when we separate Hume's claims into different justificatory contexts,
allowing induction in one but not the other. Thus, we see the contextualist reading
solving another apparent tension in Hume's treatment of inductive reasoning.
Additionally, there is a purely interpretive benefit to the contextualist reading.
The contextualist interpretation does the great philosopher the service of attributing to
him not only a grand and important project, but also the foresight of modern epistemic
developments. It maintains the historical import of his work, granting him the exposition
of the problem of induction for which he is so famous. The revisionist accounts,
especially the descriptivist, would have us extensively revise Hume's project in order to
make sense of the apparent inconsistencies. The contextualist reading, on the other hand,
is highly compatible with the traditional skeptical account; Hume is a skeptic about
induction, but only in a specific context. Though this is not necessarily a decisive
advantage, it does offer an air of plausibility when theories can be made to work without
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being overly revisionary. As Adi Parush wrote, "It could possibly happen that generations
of scholars have again and again been mistaken as to a philosopher's basic intentions. But
one should certainly check and double-check any such revolutionary interpretation lest
one fall a victim to it" (Parush, 3). That contextualism offers a defense and
modernization of the traditional interpretation is, at least to some degree, a benefit of the
theory.
I have argued that Hume is best understood as employing multiple standards of
justification for induction in a manner very similar to modern epistemic contextualism.
Inductive reasoning, it turns out, is justified in Hume's account, but only in a limited
context. Likewise, Hume endorses inductive skepticism, but only in a different context.
In the philosophical context, induction is unfounded, yet we are driven by nature to
operate in a context in which the uniformity principle and causal reasoning are justified.
For Hume, the justification of beliefs varies based on the context of the inquiry, and
realizing this resolves any apparent tension between his use and criticism of inductive
reasoning.
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